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INTRODUCTION 
 J.R. Simplot Company (“Simplot”) commenced litigation against Frank Tiegs and several 
entities he controls in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington (the 
“Washington Litigation”) in December 2016.  As this Court well knows, petitioning a court for 
relief is a fundamental, First Amendment protected right.  The Seattle law firm Yarmuth 
Wilsdon, PLLC (“Yarmuth”), along with the law firm (and now co-defendant), Thompson 
Coburn LLP, represented Simplot in the Washington Litigation.   
 One of the central allegations in the Washington Litigation was that Tiegs and his entities 
mismanaged and abused fiduciary and other duties regarding certain joint ventures that they 
undertook with Simplot, causing Simplot millions of dollars in damages.  The Washington 
complaint detailed this mismanagement, and as part of doing so, quoted from a government 
report, a government-issued press release, and an audit report prepared by NSF International 
(“NSF,” an organization that develops food and safety standards) related to Dickinson Frozen 
Foods (“DFF”), which is a closely-held Idaho corporation controlled by Frank Tiegs.  These 
materials were related to the overall claims of mismanagement by Tiegs and his entities.  The 
Washington complaint spanned 181 paragraphs and mentioned DFF in only 5 of them. 
In addition to defending the Washington Litigation, Tiegs (who is DFF’s President and 
signed the verified complaint at issue here) had DFF file in Idaho the defamation action that is on 
appeal here against Simplot and the two law firms representing Simplot, claiming a staggering 
$600 million in defamation “per se” damages – even though it sustained no actual damages.  The 
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clear purpose of the defamation action was to disrupt – and distract from – the Washington 
Litigation, and to drive a wedge between Simplot and its lawyers.   
Applying this Court’s long-standing precedent concerning the absolute litigation 
privilege, District Judge Lynn Norton dismissed DFF’s defamation claim in its entirety, correctly 
ruling that because DFF is another Tiegs-controlled entity, the statements concerning DFF’s 
health and safety practices in the Washington complaint were “reasonably related” to the 
Washington Litigation.  After considering a lengthy reconsideration motion, she held to her 
ruling of dismissal.  The Judge below did not reach the personal jurisdiction defense that the law 
firms also raised.   
On appeal, DFF now contends that Judge Norton read the absolute litigation privilege too 
broadly.  DFF offers a misleading portrait of this Court’s treatment of the privilege, and argues 
that it applies only in narrow, limited circumstances.  DFF also offers a series of “waiver” 
arguments, and purports to show that Yarmuth somehow “lost” the protection of the privilege, or 
that it was otherwise “overcome.”  In making these arguments, DFF cites a multitude of cases.  A 
close reading of those authorities, however, reveals that DFF – time and again – has 
misrepresented their holdings.   
None of DFF’s arguments hold water.  The absolute litigation privilege in Idaho – and 
everywhere else – broadly protects any client and lawyer conduct or communications that are 
reasonably related to judicial proceedings.  Whether a statement is “reasonably related” to 
litigation is not a question of fact, but a question of law for the court.  The privilege applies even 
if the supposedly defamatory statement is made in bad faith, and with knowledge of its falsity.  
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The privilege is designed to grant litigants and lawyers maximum freedom to argue their cases 
and seek justice in court, without concern that they will be subject to the sort of retributive 
nuisance lawsuit that DFF has brought here.  The privilege, moreover, is absolute, not 
conditional or qualified.  It cannot be “waived” or “overcome.” 
Judge Norton correctly read and applied this Court’s precedent concerning the absolute 
litigation privilege.  Her ruling should be upheld.  Moreover, her dismissal could also be upheld 
on the alternative grounds that there is no personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state law firms.   
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. The Origin and Substance of DFF’s Defamation Claim. 
This defamation action stems from a lawsuit that Simplot filed in the Western District of 
Washington on December 2, 2016, against Frank Tiegs and various food processing and 
distributing companies he controlled.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 14-17 ¶¶ 1, 20).  In that case, Simplot 
alleged that Tiegs and his entities had breached their fiduciary duties to Simplot with respect to 
certain joint ventures the parties had together, resulting in millions of dollars in losses.  Yarmuth 
and co-defendant, Thompson Coburn, LLP, represented Simplot in the Washington case, and 
were involved in the preparation and filing of the complaints on behalf of Simplot in that 
action.  As DFF noted in the Complaint here, Yarmuth is an out-of-state defendant – specifically, 
a Professional Limited Liability Company operating in the state of Washington.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 16 
¶ 10).  DFF did not allege that any publication of the allegedly defamatory allegations occurred 
in Idaho.  Just the opposite.  The only publications identified in the defamation complaint are (i) 
allegations in the Washington complaint and the Washington amended complaint, and (ii) 
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providing a copy of the Washington complaint to the parties’ lender, which is located in Eastern 
Washington.  
One of the central allegations Simplot raised against Tiegs and his companies in the 
Washington Litigation was that they routinely breached federal health and safety standards, 
which Simplot cited as further evidence of their overall mismanagement and part of the reason 
why the joint ventures managed by Tiegs and his companies lost money.  As additional evidence 
of this disregard for health and safety standards, the Washington complaint quoted one 
government issued press release, one publicly available government report, and an audit report 
prepared by NSF, related to DFF.  DFF was mentioned in just five paragraphs of a complaint that 
spanned 181 paragraphs.  The following are the relevant excerpts from the First Amended 
Verified Complaint in the Washington Litigation which DFF quoted in its Complaint, and which 
were the subjects of the defamation claim here: 
65. On or about December 1, 2015, in yet another incident, [the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration, an agency of the federal Department of Labor (“OSHA”)] 
cited Dickinson Frozen Foods (“DFF”), another Tiegs Affiliate located in Sugar City, 
Idaho, for a serious release of anhydrous ammonia.  A true and correct copy of OSHA’s 
press release related to this incident is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit N . . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
68. On or about May 25, 2016, OSHA cited and fined DFF again for willful 
violations of employee safety laws.  A true and correct copy of related OSHA 
documentation is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit P. 
 
69. On or about May 31, 2016, OSHA cited and fined DFF again for willful 
violations of employee safety laws, including but not limited to, those found by OSHA 
through its investigation of the December 2015 incident referenced above (Exhibit N). 
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70. Additionally, on June 13, 2016, NSF International Food Safety LLC (“NSF”) 
audited DFF’s Sugar City, Idaho facility and cited DFF for a major violation of the FSSC 
22000 Food Safety Management System (“FSSC 22000”), another safety and quality 
certification program in the food industry, after observing DFF’s repeated failure to 
provide hot water in its plant’s restrooms . . . .  A true and correct copy of NSF’s June 13, 
2016 audit report is attached hereto and incorporated as Exhibit Q. 
 
(R. Vo1. 1, pp. 17-20 ¶¶ 22-25, 28-34; pp. 1459-61 ¶¶ 65, 68-70). 
The statements concerning DFF were related to the Washington Litigation because DFF 
is an entity under Tiegs’ control, and Simplot alleged that similar poor management and unsafe 
operational practices occurred with respect to the Tiegs’s entities that were managing and 
operating the parties’ joint ventures that were the subject of the Washington Litigation.  Even 
more to the point, DFF tacitly conceded that including these sorts of materials in a complaint 
cannot be defamatory because it included the same kinds of materials in its Complaint here – 
namely, news reports alleging that Simplot committed health and safety violations.  (R. Vol. 1, 
pp. 30-45). 
 DFF filed this defamation action against Simplot and the President of Simplot’s Food 
Group, Mark McKellar, and also for good measure sued the attorneys representing Simplot in the 
Washington Litigation.  DFF also complained that the publicly filed Washington complaint was 
shared with Northwest Farm Credit Services (“NFCS”), a financial institution that was a creditor 
to one of the joint ventures involved in the Washington Litigation – as DFF itself concedes1 – 
and which had an interest in the outcome of the Washington case.  
                                           
1 DFF acknowledged in its Proposed Second Amended Complaint that “NFCS made a term loan to Pasco,” which 
was one of the joint ventures involved in the Washington Litigation, in which Simplot had an ownership stake.  (R. 
Vol. 1, p. 1397 ¶ 49).  DFF also concedes that NFCS was a lender to Pasco in its brief here.  DFF Brief at 15.   
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One other point should be stressed here.  DFF argues – as it did below– that Yarmuth has 
already “admitted” that the statements were not related to the Washington Litigation and were 
made only to “attack Tiegs’s character.”  This is simply false.  As Judge Norton noted in the 
District Court, DFF’s contention that Yarmuth “admitted” any sort of wrongdoing is “patently 
false” and “is not a valid representation of the facts in evidence.”  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 2042-43). 2  
II. The District Court Dismisses DFF’s Defamation Claim Because the Statements at 
Issue Were Reasonably Related to the Washington Litigation, and Covered by 
Idaho’s Absolute Litigation Privilege. 
 
In response to the Idaho suit, all of the defendants filed motions to dismiss DFF’s 
defamation claim.  On June 12, 2017, Judge Norton granted those motions.3  Correctly applying 
this Court’s decision in Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010), Judge Norton 
ruled – as a matter of law – that the statements referring to DFF could not form the basis of a 
defamation action because they were “reasonably related” to the Washington Litigation.  For that 
reason, Yarmuth (and the other defendants) enjoyed absolute immunity under Idaho’s litigation 
privilege.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1348-52).  Looking only at the four corners of the Complaint, Judge 
Norton held that it was clear the statements at issue were related to the Washington Litigation 
                                           
2 On April 7, 2017, Simplot filed a motion to amend the operative complaint in the Washington Litigation to remove 
the paragraphs referring to DFF.  In doing so, Simplot stated explicitly that it did not believe the paragraphs relating 
to DFF were in any way defamatory.  Rather, it filed the motion in order to take advantage of provisions in 
Washington’s Uniform Correction or Clarification of Defamation Act.  Pursuant to that Act, a party may retract a 
statement in response to receiving service of a summons and complaint alleging defamation.  If a party makes such a 
retraction in a timely manner, the plaintiff claiming defamation “may not recover damages for injury to reputation or 
presumed damages.”  RCW 7.96.060.  Simplot moved to amend the complaint and remove the paragraphs related to 
DFF simply out of an abundance of caution.  Judge Norton recognized this in her opinion.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 2042-43).  
3 Yarmuth and Thompson Coburn also moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(2).  Because she dismissed DFF’s defamation claim on the merits pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), Judge Norton 
expressly declined to consider or rule on the personal jurisdiction issue.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 1354).   
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because DFF – like the entities involved in the Washington case – were controlled by Frank 
Tiegs, who was a defendant in the Washington Litigation and who signed the Complaint in the 
Idaho case as DFF’s President.  The statements concerning DFF were thus “reasonably related” 
to the broader allegations of mismanagement of Tiegs’s entities at issue in the Washington 
Litigation.   
Judge Norton simultaneously denied DFF's motion for leave to amend as “moot” because 
none of the proposed amendments would alter the litigation privilege analysis.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 
1354).   DFF did not add any additional statements that it claimed were defamatory – it simply 
excerpted the same paragraphs from the Washington complaint detailed above.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 
761-64 ¶¶ 26-29, 35-38).  Beyond that, DFF contended that certain news sources had taken 
notice of the Washington complaint and generally reported on the Washington Litigation, but 
DFF did not contend that Yarmuth (or any other defendant) had provided the complaint to any of 
these news outlets.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 767 ¶ 46).  Because DFF’s proposed amendments did not 
contain any new statements or allege that defendants made any new publication, amendment 
would be futile. 
III. The District Court Denies DFF’s Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion 
for Leave to Amend the Complaint. 
 
On June 22, 2017, DFF filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and a renewed Motion for 
Leave to Amend its complaint.  In essence, the reconsideration motion made the same faulty 
arguments that DFF repeats here on appeal. 
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The second proposed amended complaint – again – did not contain any new allegedly 
defamatory statements – it simply offered selective quotes from the same paragraphs from the 
Washington complaint as before.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1393-94 ¶¶ 34-35).  It also explicitly 
acknowledged that NFCS had “made a term loan” to Pasco, one of the joint ventures involved in 
the Washington Litigation, and that NFCS therefore had a financial interest in the outcome of the 
Washington action.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 1397 ¶ 49).  The second proposed amended complaint also 
contained a series of conclusory assertions to the effect that Frank Tiegs “does not oversee . . . 
the day-to-day operations at any of DFF’s facilities,” and that DFF “was not legally responsible” 
for the actions of the entities involved in the Washington Litigation.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1395-97 ¶¶ 
39-46).  Finally, the second proposed amended complaint attached the Washington complaint 
quoted above, as well as numerous other pleadings from the Washington Litigation, and DFF 
urged Judge Norton to review their contents.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1385-1612).  
Judge Norton denied both of DFF’s motions on August 8, 2017.  Following this Court’s 
precedents, she correctly treated the application of the litigation privilege as a question of law for 
the court to decide.  She again held that DFF could not maintain a defamation action based on 
the statements made in the Washington Litigation because they were “reasonably related” to the 
issues in that case.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 2029-35).  She further held that DFF’s proposed amendments 
would be futile.  Because DFF did not allege any new defamatory statements, the litigation 
privilege analysis applied and acted “as an absolute bar to the defamation claims raised by 
[DFF].”  (R. Vol. 1, p. 2045).   
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
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1. The District Court correctly dismissed DFF’s defamation claim because the Yarmuth law 
firm enjoyed absolute immunity under Idaho’s litigation privilege, as the statements 
referring to DFF in the Washington complaint were reasonably related to the Washington 
Litigation. (Counterstatement to DFF Issue “b”).  
2. The District Court correctly denied DFF’s motion to amend its complaint because the 
proposed amendments did not contain any new allegedly defamatory statements or 
publications, would not impact Yarmuth’s absolute immunity pursuant to Idaho’s 
litigation privilege, and were therefore futile.  (Counterstatement to DFF Issue “a”).   
3. The District Court alternatively could have dismissed DFF’s complaint against the law 
firms because it lacked personal jurisdiction over Yarmuth.4 
ARGUMENT 
I. Standard of Review on Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). 
 This Court reviews a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) de 
novo, and applies the same standard as the district court.  Taylor, 149 Idaho at 832.  
 “A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense 
appears on the face of the complaint itself.”  Gardner v. Hollifield, 96 Idaho 609, 611, 533 P.2d 
                                           
4 Issues (c)-(e) presented in DFF’s opening brief at page 9 are not relevant to Yarmuth.  Additionally, Yarmuth was 
not required to file a notice of cross-appeal on the jurisdiction issue  I.A.R. 15(a) provides:  “If no affirmative relief 
is sought by way of reversal, vacation or modification of the judgment or order, an issue may be presented by the 
respondent as an additional issue on appeal under Rule 35(b)(4) without filing a cross-appeal.”  Here, Judge Norton 
expressly declined to rule on the jurisdiction issue, and never issued an order that could be appealed.  As such, 
Yarmuth can raise the issue simply by listing it as an additional issue pursuant to Rule 35(b)(4).     
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730, 732 (1975).  In the context of defamation actions, a complaint can and should be dismissed 
whenever “the complaint discloses the existence of an absolute privilege.”  Id. at 612. 
II. The Statements Concerning DFF Were Absolutely Privileged Because They Were 
Reasonably Related to the Washington Litigation. 
 
DFF advances two principal arguments against Judge Norton’s dismissal of its 
defamation claim.  First, DFF presents what it terms an “historical” analysis of the litigation 
privilege in Idaho, and concludes that the privilege is narrow in scope, and applies only to 
statements that are directly relevant to claims or legal questions that are actually in dispute.  DFF 
then asserts that the statements made in the Washington Litigation were not privileged because 
DFF was not a party to the Washington Litigation, and the statements could not be directly 
relevant to the specific claims at issue there.  Second, DFF makes a series of “waiver” 
arguments, all of which assert that Yarmuth somehow forfeited the immunity the privilege 
affords. 
Both arguments are wrong.  This Court has consistently expanded the scope and breadth 
of the litigation privilege, and it encompasses all statements or conduct that are “reasonably 
related” to judicial proceedings.  Statements need not be relevant to any specific legal question.  
The absolute litigation privilege is also “absolute.”  If it applies, it confers absolute immunity.  It 
cannot be waived.   
A. The History of the Litigation Privilege in Idaho Is a Story of Consistent 
Expansion of the Immunity’s Scope and Breadth and Shows This Court 
Completely Repudiating the Narrow Reading DFF Advocates Here. 
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Just as it did before Judge Norton, DFF presents this Court with a profoundly distorted 
picture of the history and current scope of the litigation privilege in Idaho.  DFF contends that all 
the major decisions of this Court – going back more than 100 years – share a “common theme.”  
Specifically, DFF argues that the litigation privilege only applies where the allegedly defamatory 
statements are “connected (i.e. pertinent, material, or reasonably related) to the content of the 
legal claims in litigation.”  DFF Brief at 26.  According to DFF, “this standard requires a factual 
connection between the defamatory statements and the litigation claims which evokes a 
sufficient reason for making the statements in the litigation.”  DFF Brief at 27.  In essence, DFF 
contends that statements must be sufficiently relevant that they would be admissible at trial under 
the Rules of Evidence.  DFF argues that this has always been the law in Idaho, despite some shift 
in the language this Court has employed over time.  DFF Brief at 24 n.13.   
 DFF is simply wrong.  This Court – in line with every court in the country – has 
consistently expanded the scope and breadth of the litigation privilege, and has consistently 
reaffirmed the principle that litigants and their lawyers should be free to prosecute their cases 
without fear of exposing themselves to the sort of nuisance lawsuit that DFF has brought here.  
The controlling standard in Idaho – and everywhere else – is that any statement made during the 
course of judicial proceedings that is reasonably related to those proceedings broadly conceived 
– and not to any specific claim or claim element – is covered by the absolute litigation privilege, 
and cannot form the basis of a defamation claim.  As discussed in detail below, DFF’s effort to 
narrowly rewrite this standard is an attempt to resurrect case law from this Court that has long 
since been overturned.  It is a futile exercise in revisionist history.   
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1. The Idaho Supreme Court’s Initial Adoption and Interpretation of 
the Litigation Privilege. 
 
 This Court first recognized the absolute litigation privilege in 1911 in Carpenter v. 
Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 114 P. 42 (1911).  There, Carpenter was an 
employee of the Grimes Company, and sued Grimes to recover wages owed for work he 
performed.  Grimes asserted counterclaims contending that Carpenter had stolen goods (pipe, 
lumber, gold nuggets) worth approximately $1,000 during his employment.  Carpenter then filed 
a separate defamation action against Grimes based on those counterclaims.   
Grimes filed a general demurrer – the 1911 equivalent of a Rule 12 motion to dismiss on 
the pleadings – arguing that “the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of 
action.”  114 P. at 44.  The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint.  The 
only question on appeal was whether a statement “set up in pleadings in judicial proceedings is 
absolutely privileged,” such that no claim for defamation could be based on it.  Id.  This Court 
characterized this as “a new question in this state,” and noted Carpenter’s contention that “one 
may be liable for maliciously setting forth certain facts although they are pleaded in a judicial 
proceeding.”  Id.  After examining the historical origins of the privilege in the common law, the 
Court concluded: 
We are satisfied that the ends of justice and the public good can best be served by 
allowing litigants to freely plead any pertinent or material matter in a judicial proceeding 
to which they are parties, holding them accountable only for defamatory matter which is 
neither pertinent nor material to the subject under inquiry. . . . The courts will determine 
as a matter of law whether the matter pleaded was in fact pertinent or material. 
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Id. at 45 (emphasis added).  Applying this rule, the Court upheld the trial court’s dismissal of 
Carpenter’s defamation claim.  The statements Grimes made in the counterclaims were “both 
pertinent and material, in that the defendant sought to offset and counterclaim any judgment that 
the plaintiff might recover.”  Id.  The Court further held that the statements were privileged 
whether they were made “with or without malice” – the privilege was absolute because Grimes 
“had a lawful right to plead the matter.”  Id. at 46.   
 Two essential principles first articulated in Carpenter remain good law today and are 
relevant here.  First, because the privilege is absolute, it cannot be waived or lost even if the 
statements at issue were made maliciously.  Second, the application of the privilege is a pure 
question of law, to be decided by the trial court at the pleadings stage.  Although the scope of the 
litigation privilege has expanded over time, these principles have never changed.   
2. The Idaho Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of the Litigation 
Privilege, and Temporarily Adopts the Position That DFF Advocates 
Here. 
 
 Eight years after Carpenter, this Court again addressed the litigation privilege in Dayton 
v. Drumheller, 32 Idaho 283, 182 P. 102 (1919).  The decision in Dayton is noteworthy because 
it essentially adopted the position that DFF takes here – namely, that the litigation privilege 
protects only those statements that are directly relevant to a claim element or legal question at 
issue.  What is devastating to DFF’s position, however, is that then Chief Justice Morgan 
vigorously dissented from this narrow reading of the privilege, and this Court subsequently 
adopted Chief Justice Morgan’s position and overruled Dayton in its entirety.  Richeson v. 
Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 552, 255 P.2d 707, 709 (1953). 
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 In his dissent, Chief Justice Morgan observed that the majority (now overturned) had 
given the terms “pertinent” and “relevant” too technical a reading, and had fundamentally 
misunderstood that the litigation privilege exists to provide litigants and lawyers with broad 
leeway to advocate their positions without fear of reprisal suits.  He argued that the majority had 
given these terms “the meanings usually intended by lawyers and judges when employing them 
in discussing the admissibility of evidence,” which was a mistake: 
These words should not be used in cases of this kind in the sense in which they are 
usually employed by members of the legal profession.  The substance of the law upon 
this subject when applied to the case under consideration is that if the language employed 
by Drumheller in his affidavit bore legitimate relation to – that it was published with 
legitimate reference to – the motion for a new trial, it was absolutely privileged, and the 
fact that, as a matter of law, it was incompetent to support the motion, is immaterial. 
 
182 P. at 105.   
 Following this analysis, Chief Justice Morgan concluded that Drumheller’s statements 
were absolutely privileged and that the trial court properly dismissed Dayton’s claim at the 
pleadings stage.  Chief Justice Morgan’s expansive view of the litigation privilege would 
ultimately become the law in Idaho – and everywhere else.   
3. The American Law Institute Publishes the First Restatement of Torts, 
Advocating the Broad Interpretation of the Litigation Privilege 
Favored by Chief Justice Morgan. 
 
 In 1923, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) was organized and it began preparing the 
Restatement, with the goal of presenting “an orderly statement of the general common law of the 
United States.”  Restatement (First) of Torts (1934), Introduction, Object and Character of the 
Restatement.  In 1938, the ALI first published the sections addressing the absolute litigation 
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privilege.  Far from adopting the narrow definition of the majority in Dayton, the ALI staked out 
the position that Chief Justice Morgan advocated.  Pursuant to the Restatement, litigants and 
their attorneys would be “absolutely privileged to publish false and defamatory matter of another 
in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or 
during the course and as part of a judicial proceeding . . ., if it has some relation thereto.”  
Restatement (First) of Torts §§ 586, 587 (1938) (emphasis added). 
 The ALI further noted that the privilege was: 
based upon a public policy of securing to attorneys as officers of the court the utmost 
freedom in their efforts to secure justice for their clients.  Therefore the privilege is 
absolute.  It protects the attorney from liability in an action for defamation irrespective of 
his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its truth or even his 
knowledge of its falsity.   
 
Restatement (First) of Torts § 586 cmt. a (1938).  This absolute immunity would apply whenever 
“the defamatory matter has some reference to the subject matter of the pending litigation” even 
if it were not “strictly pertinent or relevant to any issue involved therein.”  Id. § 586 cmt. c 
(emphasis added).   The privilege would be inapplicable only when the attorney’s publication of 
defamatory matter had “no connection whatever with the litigation.”  Id. § 586 cmt. c (emphasis 
added). 
 Fifteen years after publication of these Restatement sections, this Court took the 
opportunity to adopt them and overturn its prior decision in Dayton. 
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4. The Idaho Supreme Court Adopts the Restatement Position on the 
Absolute Litigation Privilege and Overturns Dayton v. Drumheller.   
 
 In Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P.2d 707 (1953), this Court again addressed the 
litigation privilege.  The dispute involved two attorneys, Richeson and Kessler.  Lester Anderson 
and his wife had filed a lawsuit against the Village of Garden City.  They were originally 
represented by Richeson.  During the course of those proceedings, Kessler made an application 
to appear amicus curiae.  Richeson submitted a brief objecting to Kessler’s application.  Later on, 
the Andersons discharged Richeson, and hired Kessler to proceed with the case.  Kessler then 
discovered the brief Richeson had submitted objecting to his appearance, and drafted a letter to 
the trial judge (which was also provided to other counsel of record) contending that Richeson 
had engaged in “diabolical name-calling” and that his brief was “malicious and scurrilous.” 73 
Idaho at 550.  In response to this letter, Richeson filed a separate defamation action against 
Kessler.   
 Kessler filed a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, and the trial court dismissed the case.  
Id. at 551.  This Court explicitly adopted the Restatement sections discussed above, affirmed the 
trial court’s dismissal, and articulated the following standard which remains good law today: 
With certain exceptions, unimportant here, defamatory matter published in the due course 
of a judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely 
privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation although made maliciously 
and with knowledge of its falsity. 
 
Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added).  The Court held that the letter “was written with reference and 
relation” to the broader litigation and was therefore “related to the judicial proceeding.”  Id. at 
551.  The Court further stressed that if “litigants and attorneys were not privileged in their 
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allegations in judicial proceedings” and “were to be subjected to prosecution for libel . . . justice 
would often be defeated.”  Id. at 552.  Finally – and most importantly – the Court expressly 
overruled the narrow reading previously adopted in Dayton: 
Proceedings connected with judicature of the country are so important to the public good 
it is only in extreme cases and circumstances that a libelous publication in a judicial 
proceeding can be used as a basis for damages in a libel suit . . . If the case of Dayton v. 
Drumheller, 32 Idaho 283, 182 P. 102, be construed as in conflict with the views herein 
expressed the same is expressly overruled. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 Two points should be emphasized here.  First, the allegedly defamatory statements had 
nothing to do with the claims being litigated, or any element of those claims.  They involved 
personal insults between two lawyers, one of whom was no longer involved in the action.  But 
this had no impact on the litigation privilege analysis.  Kessler enjoyed absolute immunity to 
make the statements contained in his letter because they were reasonably related – broadly 
conceived – to the Andersons’ lawsuit.  This outcome is the direct result of the Court’s decision 
to adopt the Restatement position, and to reject the narrow reading of Dayton.  And the 
repudiation of the Dayton rule also amounts to a direct repudiation of the position that DFF has 
taken here. 
Second, by the time Kessler made the allegedly defamatory statements, Richeson was no 
longer involved in the litigation.  The Andersons had discharged him, and he had become an 
uninterested third-party, just as DFF purports to be here.  This had no impact on the litigation 
privilege analysis because the statements at issue were reasonably related to the Andersons’ 
lawsuit.  In other words, this Court held that even statements concerning non-parties to litigation 
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are absolutely privileged provided they have some reasonable relation to the underlying 
proceedings.  DFF’s status as a non-party to the Washington Litigation thus has no bearing on 
the applicability of the absolute litigation privilege in this case.   
5. This Court Reaffirms the Broad Reading of Richeson, and Expands 
the Litigation Privilege Even Further. 
 
 This Court again expanded the breadth of the litigation privilege more recently in  
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010).  There, a man named Reed Taylor 
filed suit against two entities in which he held ownership stakes, as well as the managing agents 
of those entities.  McNichols represented the entities and the managing agents in that lawsuit.  
While that action was pending, Taylor “attempted to exercise management authority” over the 
entities.  149 Idaho at 831.  McNichols, as the attorney for the entities and agents, successfully 
obtained an injunction prohibiting Taylor’s activities.  Taylor then filed a separate action against 
McNichols, alleging various tort theories related to his representation of the entities and agents in 
the underlying case.   
 This separate action did not involve a claim for defamation, and Taylor did not sue 
McNichols for any allegedly defamatory statements.  Nevertheless, McNichols claimed absolute 
immunity for his actions under the litigation privilege.  This Court was thus presented with the 
question of “whether the privilege should extend to causes of action beyond defamation and 
libel,” and answered the question affirmatively.  Id. at 837.   
 The Court stressed that the litigation privilege is “deeply rooted in the common law” and 
is “predicated on the long-established principle that the efficient pursuit of justice requires that 
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attorneys and litigants must be permitted to speak and write freely in the course of litigation 
without the fear of reprisal through a civil suit.”  Id. at 836.  The Court explicitly reaffirmed 
Richeson, and then proceeded to examine case law throughout the country, ultimately holding: 
We find that when an attorney is acting in his representative capacity pursuant to 
litigation, and not solely for his own interests, he shall enjoy the litigation privilege and 
shall not be subject to suit by an opponent of his client, arising out of his representative 
conduct and communications.  
 
 Id. at 842.  The Court also stressed that it is “presumed” that attorneys are acting on behalf of 
their clients’ interests, because to “find otherwise would invite attorneys to divide their interest 
between advocating for their client and protecting themselves from a retributive suit.  Allowing 
such a divided interest would run contrary to the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Id. at 
841.5   
6. The “Persuasive Case Law” That DFF Cites in Support of Its Narrow 
Reading of the Litigation Privilege Actually Supports the Broad 
Reading Presented Here. 
 
 In support of its contention that the litigation privilege in Idaho protects only those 
statements that have “a factual connection” with “actual, legally asserted claims,” DFF cites a 
series of out-of-state authorities that it calls “persuasive case law.”  DFF Brief at 27-28.  Nothing 
could be further from the truth.  A review of those authorities reveals that they actually support 
the broad reading of the privilege discussed above.  It is worth examining these authorities in 
                                           
5 DFF also cites Weitz v. Green, 148 Idaho 851, 230 P.3d 743 (2010) as part of its historical narrative that 
supposedly supports its narrow reading of the privilege.  In point of fact, this Court in Weitz expanded the privilege 
to cover slander of title cases, and held that the same reasonable relation test would apply in such cases.  Weitz thus 
offers DFF no support whatsoever.   
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some detail because they demonstrate just how misleading DFF’s narrow reading of the litigation 
privilege is. 
 Thus in Taylor v. Iowa Park Gin Co., 199 S.W. 853 (Tex. App. 1917), the Iowa Park Gin 
Company had provided cotton to the W.L. Moody Company, which the latter was supposed to 
sell at a profit.  Iowa Park later sued W.L. Moody, contending that it had entered into a 
conspiracy with Taylor to sell the cotton below market value.  Taylor then sued the Iowa Park 
Gin Company for libel based on these allegations.  The court ruled that Iowa Park enjoyed 
absolute immunity pursuant to the litigation privilege: 
[S]tatements made by a party in his pleadings in judicial proceedings are absolutely 
privileged and can in no case give rise to an action for defamation. . . . As to the degree of 
relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory matter privileged, the 
courts favor a liberal rule.  The matter to which the privilege does not extend must be 
so palpably wanting in relation to the subject-matter of the controversy that no 
reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety.  In order that the matter 
alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues 
presented by the pleadings.   
 
199 S.W. at 855 (emphasis added).  In other words, the Texas court held that the litigation 
privilege is exceedingly broad, and even extends to statements about third parties – as DFF 
claims to be here.  DFF’s contention that Iowa Park supports its narrow reading is wrong.   
 The other “persuasive authority” DFF cites provides it no help either.  The court in 
Russell v. Clark, 620 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. App. 1981), extended the broad rule announced in Iowa 
Park to cover not just statements contained in filed pleadings, but also to statements made in 
anticipation of litigation.  In doing so, the court adopted the Restatement position (as this Court 
did in Richeson), and offered the following rationale: 
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Public policy demands that attorneys be granted the utmost freedom in their efforts to 
represent their clients.  To grant immunity short of absolute privilege to communications 
relating to pending or proposed litigation, and thus subject an attorney to liability for 
defamation, might tend to lessen an attorney’s efforts on behalf of his client. 
 
620 S.W.2d at 868.   
 
The California cases do not help DFF either.  In Silberg v. Anderson, 786 P.2d 365 (Cal. 
1990), the California Supreme Court explicitly adopted the broad “reasonable relation” standard 
that is the norm in Idaho and everywhere else.  In doing so, it expressly overruled prior decisions 
that suggested the privilege may be lost if the statement at issue was not made in the “interest of 
justice.”  786 P.2d at 215-18.6 
Thus not one of the cases DFF relies on as “persuasive authority” actually supports its 
narrow reading of the absolute litigation privilege.   
B. The District Court Properly Dismissed DFF’s Claims Because Yarmuth 
Enjoyed Absolute Immunity Under the Litigation Privilege. 
 
According to DFF, Judge Norton “failed to perform the correct litigation privilege 
analysis” because she did not examine each supposedly defamatory statement to see if it related 
to a specific claim element at issue in the Washington Litigation.  DFF Brief at 29.  DFF’s entire 
argument against Judge Norton’s ruling thus rests on the notion that she failed to apply the 
privilege analysis that this Court once adopted in Dayton, but then entirely repudiated in 
Richeson and Taylor.  DFF then proceeds to spend three pages discussing the nature of derivative 
                                           
6 In rejecting the “interest of justice” standard in favor of the “reasonable relation” analysis, Silberg also overruled 
the other decision that DFF cites as “persuasive authority” – namely, Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 30 
Cal. App. 3d 818, 106 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1973).  For obvious reasons, Bradley cannot help DFF here. 
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claims, and explaining that as a matter of corporate technicality, DFF is an independent entity 
that has a distinct management structure from the entities involved in the Washington 
Litigation.  This is all entirely beside the point.   
As the trial Court correctly observed in its ruling, “DFF’s status in the Washington 
Litigation is immaterial.”  (R. Vol. 1, p. 1350).  The only question that matters is whether the 
statements about DFF had some reasonable relation to the Washington Litigation, and the answer 
to that question is clearly yes.  DFF is an entity under the control of Frank Tiegs – indeed, Tiegs 
verified the complaint as DFF’s President.  The statements at issue concerned the health and 
safety practices of Tiegs’s entities, which was a central issue in the Washington Litigation.  The 
statements were thus sufficiently related to the overall claims of mismanagement that Simplot 
alleged.  They reinforced Simplot’s central allegations that it lost millions of dollars because of 
business practices of Tiegs and his entities.  Recognizing these facts, the District Court held:    
Because the statements in the Washington Complaint and Amended Complaint were 
reasonably related to Frank Tiegs’s business operations, which include DFF, the Court 
finds that [the] statements were reasonably related to the Washington Litigation. 
Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff’s defamation per se claims are barred by the litigation 
privilege. 
 
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 1351-52). 
DFF does not dispute any of this.  Instead, DFF contends that “the derivative nature of 
the Washington federal litigation claims isolated the claims - in terms of materiality, pertinence, 
relevance, and reasonable relation - from the defamatory statements about DFF’s food safety 
practices.”  DFF Brief at 32.  DFF notes that Washington U.S. District Court Judge Ricardo 
Martinez dismissed certain of Simplot’s direct claims in the Washington Litigation, and that the 
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remaining derivative claims belonged to the joint ventures (in which Simplot held ownership 
stakes), rather than to Simplot itself.  Based on this, DFF argues that because the derivative 
claims belonged to the joint ventures, the statements concerning DFF could have “nothing to do 
with the internal . . . member disputes in the federal litigation.”  DFF Brief at 30.   
Again, DFF is simply wrong.  DFF is asking this Court to examine each supposedly 
defamatory statement, and to determine that none of them were directly relevant to the specific 
derivative claims asserted in the Washington Litigation.  This is precisely the sort of narrow 
reading of the litigation privilege represented by Dayton, and which has not been good law in 
Idaho since at least 1953, when this Court decided Richeson.   
The District Court properly rejected this argument in denying DFF’s Motion for 
Reconsideration.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 2031-32).  Because the statements concerning DFF were 
reasonably related to the matters at issue in the Washington Litigation, broadly conceived, they 
are absolutely privileged, and cannot form the basis for any defamation claim as a matter of well-
established Idaho law. 
C. DFF’s Various “Waiver” Arguments Fail Because the Litigation Privilege Is 
Absolute and Cannot Be Waived. 
 
DFF’s remaining arguments all consist of variations on the notion that the absolute 
litigation privilege can somehow be “waived” or otherwise “overcome.”  Each of these 
arguments fails for an axiomatic reason – the litigation privilege is absolute.  It is not a 
conditional or qualified privilege which can be defeated by a showing that defamatory matter 
was published with malice or in bad faith.  Gardner, 96 Idaho at 613-14.  It is improper to 
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dismiss a complaint on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion based on a qualified privilege because the 
“malice” question implicates disputed issues of fact.  Conversely, claims should be dismissed at 
the pleadings stage whenever – as was the case here – “the complaint discloses the existence of 
an absolute privilege.”  Id. at 612.   
Tellingly, DFF has failed to cite a single case that supports the idea that the absolute 
litigation privilege, where it applies, can be “waived.”  Not one of the cases DFF cites even 
mentions “waiver” in the context of the absolute litigation privilege.  No such case exists. 
1. Providing a Copy of the Washington Complaint to the Parties’ 
Lender, Northwest Farm Credit Services, Did Not Result in Any 
“Waiver” of the Litigation Privilege.  
 DFF’s first argument is that providing a copy of the publicly filed Washington complaint 
to NFCS “had the effect of waiving or nullifying the litigation privilege.”  DFF Brief at 33.  The 
District Court held that publication of the complaint to NFCS was covered by the absolute 
litigation privilege because NFCS was a lender to Pasco, one of the joint ventures involved in the 
Washington Litigation as a party, and that NFCS thus had a financial stake in the outcome of that 
litigation.  For that reason, providing a copy of the complaint could not form the basis of any 
defamation action.  In the words of Judge Norton: 
 
The Court finds it reasonable for a limited liability company, such as Pasco, to have an 
interest in informing its creditors of pending lawsuits that may affect business 
relationships or revenue.  The Second Proposed Amended Complaint also identified 
Simplot as a fifty-percent member of Pasco. . . . From NFCS’s status as a creditor to 
Pasco, and Simplot’s status as a member of the debtor limited liability company, the 
Court determines the publication to NFCS was reasonably related to Simplot’s interests 
in the federal litigation. . . . 
 
(R. Vol. 1, pp. 2033-34).   
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 In making this determination, Judge Norton joined other courts that have unanimously 
held that the litigation privilege applies whenever allegedly defamatory materials are provided to 
third parties that have some interest in the proceedings.  Such publications fall within the 
privilege because they are deemed to be “reasonably related” to the judicial proceeding.  
Contrary to DFF’s contention, the publication does not need to be done in connection with, or in 
furtherance of, the claims in the litigation.  DFF Brief at 33.  It is sufficient if the litigation could 
have some impact on the interests of the third party.  Indeed, as Judge Norton correctly observed 
in her Order dismissing DFF’s defamation claim, the litigation privilege applies unless the 
publication is made to third parties “wholly unconnected” with the underlying proceedings. (R. 
Vol. 1, p. 1350).   
 In briefing before the District Court, Yarmuth cited numerous authorities for this position 
that DFF entirely ignores here.  For instance, in Ghafourifar v. Community Trust Bank, Inc., No. 
3:14-cv-01501, 2014 WL 4809782 (S.D.W. Va Aug. 27, 2014), a lender who had asserted claims 
against a bankrupt LLC and its managing member provided a copy of a publicly-filed motion to 
a non-party member of the LLC.  The court dismissed the managing member’s defamation claim 
against the lender as a matter of law under Rule 12(b)(6) because the litigation could impact the 
financial interests of the non-party member.  The crucial point was that the third party had “an 
interest in the litigation.”  Id. at *12.  The court clarified this point by stating that the privilege is 
only inapplicable when “statements [are] made to those without an interest” in the proceedings.  
Id.   
Other cases further underscore this point.  Thus, in eCash Technologies, Inc. v. 
Guagliardo, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2000), aff’d, 35 F. App’x 498 (9th Cir. 2002), 
plaintiff filed a lawsuit for trademark infringement against defendant, claiming that its 
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registration of the internet domain name “eCash.com” infringed the trademark.  Plaintiff’s 
lawyer then sent a letter to a third party – which was auctioning the rights to the “eCash.com” 
domain – informing the company that the domain name was subject to a pending lawsuit.  This 
act was held privileged because the communication had “some relation” to the proceedings.  127 
F. Supp. 2d at 1082.  The third party had an interest in knowing of the lawsuit because it could 
impact the auction.  Also, the “communication merely inform[ed] a third party of the pendency 
of [the] litigation,” and thus “clearly [fell] within the privilege.”  Id.; see also Epicor Software 
Corp. v. Alternative Technology Solutions, Inc., No. SACV-00448-CJC, 2013 WL 3930545, at 
*5 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2013) (“[C]ommunications ‘merely informing a third party of the 
pendency of the litigation’ are within the scope of the privilege.”).   
Not one of the cases DFF cites says anything about the absolute litigation privilege being 
“waived” or “overcome.”  A brief review of those cases demonstrates that the litigation privilege 
applies unless the publication is made to a person, or the public at large, with no connection 
whatsoever to the underlying proceedings, or with no interest in the outcome of the litigation.  
Thus in Spencer v. Spencer, 479 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1991), the litigation privilege did not apply 
because defamatory letters were published “to persons no longer having, or never having, any 
interest in the Spencer trust proceedings.”  479 N.W.2d at 295.  That is not the case here.   
Similarly, in Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 901 F. Supp. 863 (D.N.J. 
1994), plaintiff brought a claim for gender discrimination, and provided a copy of her complaint 
to a “magazine reporter” with the express aim “of obtaining publicity.”  901 F. Supp. at 871.  
The privilege did not apply because the reporter had no interest in the litigation, but was “writing 
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a piece on the subject of gender discrimination in the brokerage industry.”  Id.  The case has no 
application to the alleged facts here, but even on its own merits, the case result is likely wrong 
given the First Amendment interest of the press.7   
DFF’s reliance on Simpson Strong-Tie Co. v. Stewart, Estes & Donnell, 232 S.W.3d 18, 
20 (Tenn. 2007), for the notion that “publications to recipients who are unconnected to the 
litigation will not be privileged” is particularly misplaced.  DFF Brief at 33.  In point of fact, the 
court in Simpson held that an attorney was free to publish “what may be defamatory 
information” in newspapers to attract clients “even when the communication is directed at 
recipients unconnected with the proposed proceeding.”  232 S.W.3d at 20.  Far from supporting 
DFF”s “waiver” theory, the court in Simpson adopted a highly expansive view of the privilege. 
None of the remaining cases DFF cites support its “waiver” analysis either.   In fact, they support 
the universally recognized principal that publication to third parties is covered by the litigation 
privilege provided the third party has an interest in the litigation – as NFCS did here.8   
                                           
7 DFF’s reliance on Milford Power Ltd. P’ship by Milford Power Assocs. v. New England Power Co., 918 F. Supp. 
471 (D. Mass. 1996), is misplaced for the same reason.  There, Milford filed suit against New England Power, and 
then issued a press release accusing New England Power of criminal misconduct.  The press release was designed to 
be widely disseminated and – according to New England Power – was part of a broader scheme of extortion.  That is 
not the situation here.  DFF only alleges that defendants shared the complaint with a creditor with a direct interest in 
the outcome of the litigation.   
 
8 See Messina v. Krakower, 439 F.3d 755, 762 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (pre-litigation letter outlining claims shared with 
potential mediator privileged because mediator had “the requisite interest in or connection to the litigation”); 
Schulman v. Anderson Russell Kill & Olick, P.C., 458 N.Y.S.2d 448, 453 (N.Y. 1982) (communications are not 
absolutely privileged when they are “sent to persons wholly unconnected” to the underlying litigation); Seltzer v. 
Fields, 244 N.Y.S.2d 792, 795-96 (N.Y. 1963) (litigation privilege applies “if the offending statement may possibly 
bear on the issues in litigation now or at some future time”); Sodergren v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics 
Lab., 773 A.2d 592, 604 (2001) (the court never reached “the issue of publication to a third person not directly 
involved in the case” because the “facts of this case” did not require it).   
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2. The District Court Correctly Ruled That Yarmuth Did Not “Lose” 
the Protection of the Litigation Privilege by Engaging in any 
“Illegitimate Litigation Tactics.” 
 
DFF next argues that Yarmuth somehow forfeited the protection of the privilege by 
engaging in “street fight tactics” aimed at impugning the character of Frank Tiegs.  DFF Brief at 
37.  But the rule in Idaho is that “defamatory matter published in the due course of a judicial 
proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely privileged and will not 
support a civil action for defamation although made maliciously and with knowledge of its 
falsity.”  Richeson, 73 Idaho at 551-52 (emphasis added).  Even if DFF’s contention that 
Yarmuth published the statements concerning DFF in the Washington complaints in a bad faith 
attempt to besmirch the character of Tiegs is true (and it is not), it simply does not matter.  The 
only question that matters is whether the statements at issue were reasonably related to the 
Washington Litigation.  The answer to that question is clearly “yes.”   
Not one of the cases DFF cites supports the notion that Yarmuth lost the protection of the 
privilege by acting “outside the scope of legitimate representation.”  DFF Brief at 36.  In United 
States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1991), the court reiterated the well-known rule that in 
a criminal trial, Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits introduction of prior bad acts to prove 
propensity to commit similar bad acts in the future.  The litigation privilege was not at issue and 
was never mentioned.  Likewise, Reed v. Baltimore Life Insurance Co., 733 A.2d 1106 (Md. Ct. 
Sp. App. 1999), involved a motion for recusal of the trial judge – the litigation privilege was not 
addressed or even mentioned.  Finally, the court in Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 
2005) – like this Court did in Taylor – expanded the litigation privilege to cover not only 
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statements, but also conduct related to judicial proceedings.  The court further held that the 
absolute litigation privilege would not immunize litigants against claims of actual fraud or 
malicious prosecution – claims not at issue here.  The court in Clark did not create any 
generalized “waiver” rule for what one party might subjectively view as “illegitimate litigation 
tactics.”   
It is true that this Court in Taylor noted that an attorney’s independent conduct, which is 
outside the scope of his representation, is not covered by the litigation privilege.  But that is 
axiomatic.  The litigation privilege only applies to statements that are reasonably related to 
judicial proceedings.  No one is contending that Yarmuth or the other lawyer defendants deserve 
protection for every statement they make in whatever context merely because they are lawyers.  
The only statements at issue are those concerning DFF contained in the Washington complaints, 
which the District Court determined were reasonably related to the Washington Litigation, and 
therefore privileged. 
As a final note, it is ironic that DFF and Frank Tiegs present themselves here as victims 
of “street fight” tactics.  DFF Brief at 37.  All Yarmuth did was represent its client Simplot in a 
lawsuit in Seattle.  It is DFF – through Tiegs, its President, signing a verified complaint – that 
initiated this satellite litigation in Idaho with the transparent aim of trying to invade its 
opponents’ attorney client privilege, distract from and disrupt the Washington Litigation, and 
drive a wedge between Simplot and its lawyers in the Seattle case.  This point is underscored by 
the fact that Tiegs sued not only Simplot, but also its lawyers, claiming no actual compensatory 
damages but instead defamation “per se” damages of $600 million.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 23 ¶ 44 & n.1).      
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3. The District Court Correctly Ruled That the Statements Concerning 
DFF Were Covered by the Absolute Litigation Privilege Even Though 
DFF Was Not a Party to the Washington Litigation. 
 
DFF’s final – and equally unpersuasive – contention is that the litigation privilege is 
inapplicable because DFF was an “innocent third-party,” and that the litigation privilege cannot 
apply to statements about third parties.  DFF Brief at 37-39.  Again, this is simply untrue.  The 
only question at issue here is whether the statements concerning DFF were reasonably related to 
the Washington Litigation.   
In an effort to get around this rule, DFF argues that no court in Idaho has ever addressed 
whether the litigation privilege extends to third parties, but that is false.  As discussed above, the 
allegedly defamatory statements at issue in Richeson had no connection to the underlying claims 
being litigated, and were directed at a lawyer (Richeson) who had been discharged from 
representing the Andersons at the time the statements were made.  Richeson had become a third 
party to the underlying litigation.  The statements Kessler made about him were still covered by 
the litigation privilege because they had a reasonable relationship to the lawsuit.  73 Idaho at 
551-52. 
Aside from the Richeson decision itself, Yarmuth cited extensive precedent below 
demonstrating that courts universally acknowledge that statements made about third parties are 
covered by the absolute litigation privilege provided they were reasonably related to the 
litigation.  See, e.g, Collins v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., 566 S.E.2d 595, 603 (W. Va. 2002) (“[A] 
party to a dispute is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter about a third person who 
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is not a party to the dispute” if “the defamatory statement is related to the prospective judicial 
proceeding.”).9  
DFF entirely ignores these authorities because it has no answer to them.  Indeed, the 
precedent DFF cites actually supports the principle that statements concerning third parties are 
covered by the privilege.  See, e.g. Anderson v. Hartley, 270 N.W. 460 (Iowa 1936); Taylor v. 
Iowa Park Gin Co., 199 S.W. 853, 855 (Tex. App. 1917) (“The fact that the person alleged to 
have been defamed in the pleadings is not a party to the proceedings has been held not to detract 
from the privileged character of the publication.”).   
In ruling that “DFF’s status in the Washington Litigation is immaterial,” Judge Norton 
got it exactly right. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1350-52).  In her words:  “Because the statements in the 
[Washington Litigation] were reasonably related to Frank Tiegs’s business operations, which 
include DFF . . . [the] statements were reasonably related to the Washington Litigation” and 
cannot form the basis of a defamation action.  (R. Vol. 1, p. 1352).   
III. The Trial Court Properly Denied DFF’s Motion to Amend Because Any Such 
Amendment Would Have Been Futile. 
 
 While it is generally true in Idaho that “motions for leave to amend pleadings are to be 
liberally granted,” the trial court should also consider whether the proposed amendment would 
state a valid claim.  Taylor, 149 Idaho at 847.  “A court is not required to permit the amendment 
                                           
9 See also Simon v. Navon, 951 F. Supp. 279, 282 (D. Me. 1997) (statements made about third-party prior to filing of 
lawsuit were absolutely privileged because they were “the very definition of communications in anticipation of 
litigation” and had “some relation to the proceeding”); Jenevein v. Friedman, 114 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. App. 
2003) (“even statements aimed at non-parties are absolutely privileged if they bear some relation to the 
proceeding”). 
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of a complaint where such amendment would be futile.”  Eagle Equity Fund, LLC v. TitleOne 
Corp., 161 Idaho 355, 362, 386 P.3d 496, 503 (2016).  If “the amended pleading does not set out 
a valid claim . . . it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the motion to file the 
amended complaint.”  Id.  (quoting Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat’l 
Bank, N.A., 119 Idaho 171, 175, 804 P.2d 900, 904 (1991)). 
 As Judge Norton correctly ruled – not just once, but twice – amendment would have been 
futile here.  DFF’s defamation claim in both the first and second proposed amended complaints 
was based on exactly the same statements in the Washington Litigation to which DFF objected in 
the original complaint.10  The first proposed amended complaint also noted that some Idaho 
news outlets had reported on the Washington Litigation, but never alleged that any defendant 
provided the Washington complaint to the news media.  Apparently some reporters in Idaho did 
what reporters do – they looked up court filings in the public record and used them in news 
articles.  Neither Yarmuth, nor any one of the defendants, can control what the news media does, 
and they cannot be held responsible for “defamation” based on the independent actions of 
reporters.  
The second proposed amended complaint added a series of conclusory allegations to the 
effect that DFF was a separate entity from the joint ventures involved in the Washington 
Litigation, and that Frank Tiegs exercised no managerial control over DFF.  As discussed above, 
this is simply irrelevant to the litigation privilege analysis.  None of this changed the fact that 
                                           
10 Compare R. Vol. 1, pp. 17-20 ¶¶ 22-25, 28-34 with pp. 761-64 ¶¶ 26-29, 35-38 with pp. 1393-94 ¶ 34-35. 
   - 33- 
  
DFF is a Tiegs entity, that Tiegs verified the Complaint on behalf of DFF, and that the allegedly 
defamatory statements concerning DFF’s health and safety practices were reasonably related to 
the Washington Litigation for that reason.  In acknowledging that NFCS was a lender to Pasco, 
moreover, the second proposed amended complaint confirmed that providing NFCS a copy of 
the complaint was an absolutely privileged publication. 
The simple fact of the matter is that DFF cannot base any defamation claim on the 
statements in the Washington complaints for all of the reasons discussed above, and in Judge 
Norton’s orders.  Courts have routinely refused to permit plaintiffs to amend in this precise 
situation.  See Mnyandu v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 14-6485, 2015 WL 6445652, at *3 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2015) (Dismissing plaintiff’s claim under Rule 12(b)(6) under litigation 
privilege and holding “leave to amend  . . . would be futile given defendants’ absolute 
immunity”); In re Microbilt Corp., 588 F. App’x 179, 180 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that conduct 
in legal proceeding is protected by absolute litigation privilege and “that any amendment to the 
complaint would be futile”).11  
None of the authorities DFF cites has any impact on this analysis.  DFF relies principally 
on Savage v. Scandit, Inc., 163 Idaho 637, 417 P.3d 234 (2018), to argue that Judge Norton erred 
in denying its motions to amend.  But that decision never even addressed the absolute immunity 
                                           
11 See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shah, No. 2:15-cv-01786, 2017 WL 1228406, at *3 (D. Nev. Mar. 31, 2017) (The 
court dismissed the abuse of process claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and held: “[b]ecause the litigation privilege shields 
Allstate from this claim, amendment of the counterclaim would be futile.  Thus, dismissal is with prejudice.”); Lory 
v. Fed. Ins. Co., 122 F. App’x 314, 319 (9th Cir. 2005) (denying motion to amend where complaint dismissed on 
Rule 12(b)(6) under litigation privilege).   
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conferred by the litigation privilege, or any other privilege or immunity.  The case revolved 
around issues of fact as to when certain payments from an employer to an employee became due 
for purposes of the Idaho Wage Claim Act.  Amendment was proper because plaintiff could 
plead additional facts demonstrating that she was entitled to the payments.  Here, whether the 
statements at issue were reasonably related to the Washington Litigation presented a pure 
question of law.12   
DFF’s final argument is an act of pure desperation.  DFF comments that “[s]ome 
jurisdictions do not allow the assertion of the litigation privilege in a motion to dismiss.”  DFF 
Brief at 20.  That is both irrelevant and a false statement of law.  This Court has explicitly held 
that a complaint “is subject to dismissal under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6)” if the complaint “discloses the 
existence of an absolute privilege.”  Gardner 96 Idaho at 612.  Indeed, this Court upheld Rule 
12(b)(6) dismissals (or their equivalent) in Carpenter, Richeson and Taylor.   
In short, DFF misconceives the nature of the litigation privilege.  It is an absolute 
immunity from any lawsuit based on statements that are reasonably related to judicial 
proceedings.  DFF could not plead new “facts” demonstrating how or why certain statements 
were irrelevant to the specific claims at issue in the Washington Litigation.  It was a question of 
law for the court.  When Judge Norton determined that the statements at issue were reasonably 
related to the Washington Litigation, the absolute litigation privilege applied and the case was 
                                           
12 DFF cites some additional case law on page 18 of its brief that all stand for the unremarkable proposition that a 
court should grant leave to amend when additional facts would permit a plaintiff to state a claim.  See Markstaller v. 
Markstaller, 80 Idaho 129, 134-35, 326 P.2d 994, 997 (1958); Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 325, 715 P.2d 993, 
995 (1986); Crews v. Ellis, 531 So.2d 1372, 1377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).   Not one of these cases so much as 
mention the absolute litigation privilege, or has any other relevance to the issues presented here.   
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over.  DFF’s proposed amendments were futile because they did not allege any new defamatory 
statements, or any new publication by any defendant.   
IV.  The Suit Could Also Have Been Dismissed Because of a Lack of Personal 
Jurisdiction Over Yarmuth, a Seattle Law Firm. 
 
 Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(2), a District Court must dismiss an action if it lacks personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant.  If a plaintiff fails to “allege[] facts that would give rise to personal 
jurisdiction” in the complaint, dismissal pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) is warranted.  Ponderosa 
Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 314, 870 P.2d 663, 667 (1994); Schnieder v. Sverdsten 
Logging Co., 104 Idaho 210, 214 n.2, 657 P.2d 1078, 1082 n.2 (1983) (plaintiff bears the 
“burden of proving jurisdictional facts”).  Here, DFF invoked Idaho’s long-arm statute, “which 
provides for specific rather than general jurisdiction.”  Telford v. Smith Cnty., Texas, 155 Idaho 
497, 501, 314 P.3d 179, 183 (2013); R. Vol. 1, p. 16 ¶ 13.  As such, DFF bore the burden of 
pleading and proving facts sufficient to invoke specific personal jurisdiction over Yarmuth.   
 Generally, a trial court in Idaho “has no personal jurisdiction outside of the state 
boundaries.”  Brannon v. City of Coeur d’Alene, 153 Idaho 843, 851, 292 P.2d 234, 242 (2012).  
Thus, to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, two requirements must be met:  “(1) 
the act giving rise to the cause of action must fall within the scope of Idaho’s long-arm statute, 
Idaho Code section 5-514; and (2) jurisdiction must not violate the out-of-state defendant’s due 
process rights.”  Gailey v. Whiting, 157 Idaho 727, 730, 339 P.3d 1131, 1134 (2014).  DFF failed 
to plead facts that would satisfy either requirement. 
A. DFF Failed to Allege Facts Sufficient to Establish Jurisdiction Under the 
Long-Arm Statute.  
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DFF alleged a single tort claim (defamation per se) against out-of-state defendant 
Yarmuth.  As such, the relevant provision of the long-arm statute was section 5-514(b), which 
permits assumption of jurisdiction over non-resident persons or entities for causes of action 
arising from “[t]he commission of a tortious act within this state.” I.C. § 5-514(b) (emphasis 
added).  That means that “not just any contacts by the defendant with Idaho” will permit 
exercising jurisdiction, “but only those out of which the suit arises or those that relate to the 
suit.”  Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 75, 803 P.2d 978, 981 (1990).  
DFF’s complaint did not allege that Yarmuth committed any tortious act within Idaho.  
To the contrary, DFF alleged a defamation claim against Yarmuth based on Yarmuth filing a 
pleading in a federal court in Seattle, Washington.  (R. Vol. 1, pp. 1459-61).  The Washington 
complaint was filed by Washington lawyers in a Washington court in Seattle to get that 
Washington court to act on the claim for relief in Washington.  Later sending a copy of the 
complaint to NFCS’s representatives – who are also in Washington – does not change the lack of 
jurisdiction.  None of Yarmuth’s actions occurred in Idaho, or were otherwise directed at Idaho.   
This Court’s decision in Gailey is on point.  There, Bill Gailey, an Oregon resident, 
brought a claim for professional negligence against Kim Whiting, a life insurance agent who sold 
Gailey a policy in Boise.  157 Idaho at 729.  Gailey travelled to Boise to purchase the policy 
from Whiting’s agency.  In 2011, Gailey called Whiting for advice about the policy and Whiting 
advised Gailey to surrender his policy and cash out the remainder of its value.  Gailey contacted 
Whiting by telephone, but Whiting was no longer in Idaho – he had moved to Hawaii and had 
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cancelled his Idaho insurance license.  Gailey followed Whiting’s advice and later suffered 
adverse tax consequences as a result.  Id.   
Gailey filed suit against Whiting in Idaho, asserting a claim of professional negligence.  
The trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction over Whiting, and this Court affirmed: 
“Whiting committed the allegedly tortious act of giving bad advice in Hawaii, not in Idaho.  
Because Whiting did not commit the alleged tort in Idaho, there is no basis in this case over 
which the district court could have exercised personal jurisdiction over Whiting under Idaho 
Code section 5-514(b).”  Id. at 732.  Because the long-arm statute provided no basis to assume 
jurisdiction, this Court did not reach the due process analysis.  Id.  
 That is the situation here.  Everything that Yarmuth did on behalf of Simplot occurred in 
Washington, and DFF does not – because it cannot – allege otherwise.  DFF’s assertion in 
briefing before Judge Norton that Yarmuth somehow “expressly aimed” the supposedly 
defamatory statements at Idaho is also grossly misleading and unavailing.  In all of the cases 
DFF cited, the out-of-state defendant either travelled into Idaho and committed a tort, or engaged 
in tortious activity by making telephone calls or sending emails to Idaho residents that directly 
resulted in harming them.13  That is not the case here.   
 B. The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution Precludes Jurisdiction. 
                                           
13 See, e.g., Blimka v. My Web Wholesaler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723, 727, 152 P.3d 594, 598 (2007) (long-arm statute 
applied where Maine corporation made fraudulent representations to Idaho resident and shipped faulty product into 
Idaho); Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., Combustion Control Div., 93 Idaho 26, 27-28, 454 P.2d 63, 64-65 (1969) 
(defendant sent a defective boiler into the stream of commerce which exploded in Idaho); R. Vol. 1, pp. 1274-77. 
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 Even if the Idaho long-arm statute applied here (and it does not), the district court still 
lacked jurisdiction over Yarmuth under controlling precedent.  In Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 
(2014), the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the circumstances in which assumption of jurisdiction 
over an out-of-state defendant violates due process in the tort context.  There, plaintiff claimed to 
be a “professional gambler” who was stopped and investigated at an Atlanta airport for 
transporting large amounts of cash.  A police officer involved in the stop submitted a “probable 
cause” affidavit to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Georgia, which resulted in the cash being seized 
temporarily.  After the investigation concluded and the cash was returned, plaintiff filed suit 
against the officer in Nevada, contending that submission of the probable cause affidavit caused 
him injury.  All of the officer’s actions occurred in Georgia, but plaintiff contended Nevada had 
jurisdiction because the effects of those actions were felt in Nevada, the plaintiff’s home state.  
The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed: 
Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally relevant only 
insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact with the forum State.  The 
proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but 
whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a meaningful way. 
 
571 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added).  Because the officer prepared and submitted the affidavit in 
Georgia, and none of his activities occurred in or had any meaningful connection with Nevada, 
the Nevada court could not assume jurisdiction over him consistent with due process.   
 Just last year, the Supreme Court again emphasized that specific personal jurisdiction is 
narrow, and does not permit a forum state to assume jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant 
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based on tenuous connections.  In Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., San Francisco 
Cnty., __ U.S. __, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017):   
Our settled principles regarding specific jurisdiction control this case.  In order for 
a court to exercise specific jurisdiction over a claim, there must be an affiliation between 
the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, [an] activity or an occurrence 
that takes place in the forum State.  When there is no such connection, specific 
jurisdiction is lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected activities 
in the State. 
 
137 S.Ct. at 1781 (quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 
Here, Yarmuth prepared the Washington complaints in Washington and filed them in a 
Washington federal court in Seattle.  Yarmuth did nothing in Idaho.  The only connection that 
Idaho has to this case is that DFF is located here.  That is plainly insufficient to establish 
personal jurisdiction under the authorities discussed above.14 
CONCLUSION 
   Based on long-established and clear Idaho precedent, the rulings below were correct and 
the judgment should be affirmed.   
  
                                           
14 DFF’s argument before Judge Norton that personal jurisdiction is proper because it felt the “effects” of the alleged 
defamation in Idaho is also unavailing.  In all of the cases DFF cited, defendants had substantial contacts with the 
forum state, and took deliberate action aimed at harming an individual in the forum state.  See e.g., Calder v. Jones, 
465 U.S. 783 (1984) (California could assume jurisdiction over National Enquirer because author was physically 
present and researched article in California, and article was published and distributed in California); Nw. Voyagers, 
LLC v. Libera, No. CV09-378, 2009 WL 3418199 (D. Idaho Oct. 19, 2009) (personal jurisdiction existed because 
defendants sent numerous emails, and made numerous internet postings, all designed to damage former business 
partners in Idaho).   
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